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Abstract 
A number of regulatory options have been discussed for the reduction of GHG‘s  in 
the maritime sector. The International Maritime Organisation has on the table a 
mixture of measures ranging from command and control instruments such as the 
Energy Efficiency Design Index to market based measures such as international 
cap-and-trade and levy. It is possible that policies in this area will develop to be a 
mixture of the above international measures as well as regional measures. In light of 
this, the paper attempts to contextualize the potential of reduction of GHG emissions 
using a holistic/systemic approach. An in-depth characterisation and analysis of the 
current/existing shipping stakeholder space is made in order to identify potential 
responsible entities for the proposed measures. Barriers and opportunities existing 
therein are further analysed with particular focus on the principal agent problem. The 
Viable Systems Model is used to depict system roles of the shipowner and charterer 
and ties together the relevant findings from the preceding systems tools.  
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1. Background to the shipping industry 
The shipping industry provides transport for the movement of cargoes that are traded 
regionally and internationally and as such the industry is a global network of 
stakeholders that exist to pursue this purpose. International shipping accounted for 
2% to 4% of global CO2 emissions in 2009 and it is estimated that this share wil l 
grow by 150 -250% (compared to emissions in 2007) by 2050, if the industry is left 
uncontrolled and in absence of policies. To this date, International shipping and 
aviation have not been incorporated in a global treaty and have been categorically 
left out by United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 
the Kyoto Protocol (1997) due to the inability to attribute bunker fuels/emissions to 
national inventories. However, the Protocol mandates the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO) to address the issue of mitigation of maritime GHG’s. Inter-
governmental negotiations are underway in this regard, within the framework of the 
IMO‘s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC). 
 
The IMO is a specialised UN agency responsible for regulating the maritime sector, 
which pursues its global mandate by adopting internationally agreed rules and 
standards that are implemented and enforced by state parties in the exercise of flag, 
port and coastal state jurisdictions. To do this without distorting maritime 
sector/contravention of UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), it applies a 
universal principle of ‗No more favourable treatment‘ (NMFT). This is in contrast with 
UNFCCC, which applies a ‗Common but Differentiated Responsibility‘ (CBDR) 
principle to the member states which constitute of annex i and non-annex i countries. 
This has led the non-annex i parties of the UN, to come to the IMO MEPC ascribing 
to the CBDR principle to divert from them, any universally applied GHG measures. A 
ship is a territorial extension of the country whose flag it flies and must be registered 
to a certain flag (i.e. country) in order to operate and be governed by the rules of that 
state. However, because the ship is a moveable entity, it becomes easy to change 
legal jurisdiction, by registering to a flag of choice (often called flag of convenience, 
that provide benefits such as tax and low compliance to safety, and lack of 
enforcement) resulting in lower costs of operation (as shown below in figure 1). For 
these reasons attribution of bunker fuels and CO2 emissions to a specific nation is 
very complex (SBSTA, 1999; CSC & WWF, 2011). Shipping is understood to be 
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placed in a perfectly competitive market structure (Stopford, 2009), where freight 
rates just breakeven with operational costs, thus cost cutting as highlighted above 
provides shipping the ability to survive and make profits during peaks. This 
investment nature gives little importance to CO2 emissions, which generally take a 
low priority amongst many other factors in shipping e.g. when setting a charterparty 
(CE Delft et al., 2009). 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of vessel ownership, flag registration and trade.   
Source: Compiled from UN Comtrade and Clarksons World Fleet monitor 2010 
 
2. Brief outline of policy measures proposed for CO2 reduction in shipping 
In general, for policy makers, there are three strands of measures that can be opted. 
The taxonomy of such measures is outlined below:  
 Command and control measures – these are direct form of regulations that have 
high dependability and predictability but commonly prove inefficient and inflexible.  
 Economic/Market based measures – tend be indirect form of regulation that tend 
to be efficient but not dependable.  
 Information strategies/self regulation – tend be non-coercive, un-intrusive and 
cost effective but have low reliability and dependability.  
     Adapted from: (Gunningham et al., 1998) 
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In the light of the policies at the IMO, the diagram below shows how shipping policies 
are abundant in the command and control regime, in comparison to market and 
information based measures. This highlights that shipping over the decades has 
been accustomed to direct regulation, hence mitigating CO2 emission for shipping 
with other methods poses a significant challenge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Use of different type of measures in shipping 
Currently there are ten measures under consideration by the IMO for reducing GHG 
emissions from shipping. These have been proposed by various member states and 
international bodies, who have taken either a command and control (C&C) approach 
or market based (mbm) approach to meet the required level of reductions. Under 
C&C approach, proposals made by Bahamas, Japan in its Leveraged Incentive 
Scheme and World Shipping Council in its Vessel Effciciency Scheme, make use of 
the Energy Efficiency Design Index, which is applied to new ships, hence reliant on 
in-sector reductions. Under the mbm approach an international fund by Denmark, 
Port State Levy by Jamaica, Global Emissions Trading Scheme by Norway and 
Global sectoral emissions trading scheme by UK and France, with the exception of 
Ship Efficiency & Credit Trading by US, all rely on out of sector mechanism to 
achieve reductions i.e. carbon offsetting. It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
analyse the policy measures but IMO through its expert group study (IMO, 2010) and 
in the latest IMO GHG intersessional WG will be exploring these options in greater 
detail.  
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Figure 3: Overview of IMO policy measures 
 
3. Stakeholder mapping and analysis  
The future GHG regulation landscape for shipping is highly uncertain due to the 
plethora of proposals currently under consideration coupled with the complex 
regulatory structure within IMO and UNFCCC. At this juncture, a naive but important 
question arises as to why would an industry be subject to such mandatory 
regulations for energy efficiency when there has always been a business case for 
energy efficiency? For shipping, greater efficiency and reducing fuel consumption is 
a win-win situation: less air pollution from emissions and lower fuel bills (Sustainable 
Shipping, 2010), especially at current fuel prices of around $650 per tonne. This 
hints that there are intricate inadequacies within, which may be hampering the 
uptake of potential energy efficiency measures. This does not apply only to technical 
measures but operational as well, e.g. the Virtual Arrival code developed by OCIMF 
and Intertanko (Ranheim & Hallet, 2010), which made use of speed reduction based 
on known delays at ports, hence bringing together various stakeholders for a shared 
benefit. Initial trials show reduction of CO2 emissions by up to 27%, acclaimed also 
by (DNV, 2009). This is a great tool for the industry, as it removes some of the 
inefficiencies within that trade (oil traded on spot market), however there is still a 
need for it to be more standardised, to be applicable to tankers trading in different 
markets, as well as appealing to other ship types.  
In sector reductions 
Command & Control 
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 Vessel Efficiency Scheme – World 
Shipping Council 
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The analysis of barriers is important because MBM‘s need to provide incentive to 
change. One of the nine criteria (IMO, 2010) for MBM is that ―the proposed MBM's 
potential to provide incentives to technological change and innovation – and the 
accommodation of current emission reduction and energy efficiency technologies‖. 
Hence, an understanding of incentivisation of stakeholders is important in order to 
understand why significant cost-effective energy efficiency measures are not being 
applied. A detailed understanding of the key stakeholders and barriers/opportunities 
within shipping is required, and to that end the generic stakeholder map below 
shows a bird‘s eye view of the participants within the sector. As a systems thinking 
tool, stakeholder map forms the initial stages, followed by other processes that form 
the nine step process in stakeholder analysis (Tansley, 2005). Using the power vs. 
stake of each stakeholder (two dimensional grid) will help to elicit which stakeholders 
have the most authority, influence in decision making and incentives to energy 
efficiency, which altogether will allow a policy to be targeted or geared towards these 
stakeholders. There are three main relationships/links (Ship owner and ship yard, 
Ship owner and charterer, Ship and port) that are being explored for further 
investigation of barriers/opportunities that exist therein. An outline of the main 
barriers (identified from literature) existing between these is provided in figure 4. 
Ship owner and ship yard  
According to Stopford (2009), basic ship designs varied little over the second half of 
the 20th century leading to the industry being classed as conservative. House of 
Commons (2009), linked the industry to low levels of R&D. In the initial design stage, 
―Shipyards react more on the principle that something is difficult to make, instead of 
expensive to make. Shipyards put up barriers that they only want to build vessels to 
type‖ AEA (2008). ―In the preliminary design phase, some of the main contours, for 
the ship have already been set by the shipowner ‗tender‘, thus innovative ideas may 
therefore be cut short‖ Veenstra & Ludema (2006). The influence of ship brokers in 
governing the design of a new ship is significant and they also discourage owners to 
change standard designs by arguing that these changes might negatively influence 
the resale value of the ship in the future‖ Veenstra & Ludema (2006). ―Unlike some 
industries, shipping has a highly liquid sale and purchase market for its fixed assets, 
the ships, that fluctuates constantly on pure supply and demand factors‖ Lloyds List 
(2011), thus the inclusion (or non inclusion) of energy efficiency improvements are 
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not reflected in the asset price, Stopford (2009). Moreover this market based 
approach to valuing ships leaves out the revenue/earning potential of ships which 
can take into account fuel efficiency measures, new design premiums and 
depreciation. This method of valuing ships is rarely taken into account but such 
methods are just making their way in to the books e.g. Value in Use, Lloyds List 
(2011).  
 
 
Figure 4: Stakeholder map of the shipping industry 
Ship owner and charterer 
The principal agent barrier is well documented in literature (AEA, 2008; CE Delft et 
al, 2009), whereby the ship owner has no incentive to improve the energy efficiency 
of a ship if the charterer is paying the fuel bills. According to AEA, 2008 traditionally 
the industry has been focused on fast delivery, especially in the general cargo and 
container sectors, as time spent in transit increases the inventory costs of the 
customer and speed reduction is limited to a small number of countries. Moreover, 
conditions set out in charter parties prevent slow steaming (BIMCO, 2008). 
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Ship and port 
Standard charter party contracts stipulate that a chartered vessel must sail at ‗utmost 
despatch‘ without consideration of berth availability at destination ports (Alvarez et 
al, 2010). This provides the master an incentive to sail at full speed to the ports 
which admit vessels on a first come first serve basis. According to DNV (2009) these 
berthing policies (and charter contracts) have the potential of removing around 60 
million tonnes of CO2 p.a. at a net benefit (cost savings) of $80/tCO2. Moreover in 
some trades especially oil markets trading on spot, ships have a tendency to change 
directions due to arbitrage opportunities, making it difficult to pre-book berths. In 
some dry bulk markets waiting times at anchorage are beyond industry norms (of 
around 1-3 days), and sometimes be up to 20 days (Habibi, 2011). Similar problems 
are noted in the aviation sector where operating practices of airlines prevent them 
travelling at the speed and altitude for which the aircraft was designed. Omega 
(2009) link this to airports and air traffic management systems, which for various 
reasons restrict the cost effective potential (negative abatement potential for CO2) 
and short term win-win scenario available for the aviation sector.  
 
4. Analysis of principal agent problem in context of energy efficiency in 
shipping 
Upon identifying the key stakeholders, relationships and main barriers above, it 
would be appropriate to assume that there are market barriers that continue to 
prevent optimal energy efficiency. Market barriers in the context of energy efficiency 
can be broadly understood as ‗market-related factors that inhibit energy efficiency 
improvements‘ (IPCC, 2001). Many studies have confirmed the presence of such 
barriers in markets as well as in context of energy efficiency (see for example Jaffe & 
Stavins, 1994; DeCanio, 1993; DeCanio, 1994; Brown, 2001; Sorrell et al., 2004; 
Sathaye, 2004; Guertler, 2005; and IEA, 2007). IEA (2007) shows market barriers 
fall within three categories; low priority accorded to energy efficiency, lack of access 
to capital and incomplete markets for energy efficiency. Hill (2010) in analysis of 
barriers in shipping, categorises barriers into four categories namely; economic, 
technical, structural and regulatory.  
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Of the above barriers, one that is often cited in literature pertaining to energy 
efficiency in shipping is the principal agent problem or the issue of split incentives  
(AEA, 2008, CE Delft et al, 2009, IMarEST, 2010). The principal agent problem 
according to the IEA falls under the low priority accorded to energy efficiency 
category and classed as economic barrier. In quantification of the principal agent 
problem IEA estimates the principal agent affects significant proportion of end-use 
energy (3800 PJ/year in 8 cases across 3 sectors). Stemming from agency theory, 
the principal agent problem describes the conflicting actions of the parties involved in 
a contract, who tend to have divergent goals. As an example the tenant-landlord 
scenario is often cited. The landlord typically wants to minimise capital costs, hence 
will not invest in energy efficiency of the building as opposed to a tenant who actually 
pays the energy costs related to the investment. Therefore the landlord has no 
incentive to make energy efficient investment as only the tenant benefits from these 
reduced costs. In some cases where markets are efficient this may not hold, as a 
landlord who has invested in energy efficiency of his building should be 
compensated with higher rent. This issue takes us back to the original barrier of how 
much priority is actually accorded by the market to energy efficiency.  
Analogous to the landlord-tenant scenario, in shipping, the principal agent problem 
(in context of energy efficiency) could exist between a multitude of stakeholders 
aforementioned e.g. between charterer and freight forwarder, decision to slow steam 
in laden leg provides benefits for the charterer but may adversely affect the shipper, 
shipowner hiring a ship manager to oversee the day to day running of the ship. 
However, much literature has focussed on the ship owner and the charterer. CE 
Delft et al 2009 and AEA 2008, show that there is scope to reduce emission by 10% 
cost effectively but measures are not being implemented due to the existence of split 
incentives. Similarly for aviation, Omega (2009) show that a range of interventions 
could enable the aviation sector to abate about 12-15% of its CO2  emissions at 
negative or zero cost by 2012, in a normal fuel price scenario. According to IMarEST 
―the biggest institutional barrier to implementing energy efficiency measures is the 
divided responsibility between shipowner and charterer for fuel costs‖. CE Delft also 
estimate that bunker costs of about 70-90% of fuel consumed in the industry are 
typically passed on (although cost pass through alone is not proof for split incentives)  
e.g. through different charterparties, bunker adjustment factors (BAF) and freight 
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rates that include a portion of fuel consumed e.g. Cost Insurance Freight (CIF) in oil 
trading.   
Figure 5 below briefly represents of the various charterparties existing within 
shipping and how this translates into responsibility for fuel payments, which may give 
rise to principal agent problems. In scenario 1 the principal and the agent are the 
same entity, hence investment in energy efficiency is made by the same person 
paying for the energy costs. A classical example of this would be some of Maersk‘s 
fleet which is owned and operated by Maersk, giving it the incentive to invest in 
energy efficient ships and technology. In the tanker trade this applies to for example 
major oil companies, which own and operate a small percentage of their own fleet. 
However even within the owner-operated fleet, the principal agent problem may still 
persist if there is an ability to pass on the fuel costs even at times of higher freight 
rates for example through BAF‘s (Cariou and Wolff, 2006).  
 
In scenario 2 the principal and the agent are separate entities. The principal (in this 
case the charterer) who has the ship on a time charter is liable to pay for fuel costs 
as well as the daily rates to the ship owner (the agent). The ship owner pays for all 
other costs including canal/port dues, crewing, maintenance and capital costs (refer 
to appendix). There are two instances of principal agent problem in this scenario. 
Firstly the ship owner lacks the incentive for investing in an energy efficient 
ship/technology (minimising capital costs) since the fuel is paid for by the charterer. 
Secondly the ship owner is in control of operation of the ship (hence liability for all 
other costs) therefore the ‗operation of the ship is not under the control of the party 
paying for the fuel‘ (CE Delft et al, 2009). It is partly due to this split incentive coupled 
with the short/medium time horizon, that most cost-negative abatement measures 
such as those identified by DNV (2009) are not implemented, around 150 million 
tonnes of CO2 related to cost negative operations and another 150 million tonnes of 
CO2 related to technical measures (refer to appendix). Hill (2010) argues this is one 
of the major drawbacks of marginal abatement cost curves as they tend to assume 
markets to be homogenous. As mentioned earlier where markets are efficient 
(perfectly competitive), this assumption may not hold, thus a ship consuming less 
fuel would fetch higher rates and vice versa. This issue takes us back to the original 
barrier of how much priority is actually accorded by the market to energy efficiency. 
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CE Delft argue ―that fuel consumption is only one of many factors that impact a 
ship's charter rate and certainly not the most important one‖.  
 
In scenario 3 the ship owner is responsible for all costs pertaining to an individual 
voyage (voyage charter) therefore initially there is some incentive to improve energy 
efficiency of a ship. The charterer only pays for the total cost (freight rate $/tonne) 
which will include some portion of the fuel cost. The level of principal agent problem 
here depends on the level of cost pass through in different markets and business 
cycles. When demand for shipping is higher than supply of ships, ship owners can 
absorb additional costs and when demand for shipping is lower than supply, then 
costs will be passed through further down the chain (CE Delft, 2010). Scenario 4 
illustrates a bareboat/Contract of Affreightment which is similar to scenario 2 except 
the time period of the charter. Again, there is a high likelihood that principal agent 
problem occurs here (AEA, 2008) but due to longer time period and bargaining 
power (through renegotiation at end of contract), the charterer has an incentive to 
reduce fuel bills through retrofit measures with payback within the investment 
horizon. 
 
In comparison to the international aviation sector, charters fall mainly into two main 
categories; long term charter (dry lease) or ad hoc charter (wet lease). Most airlines 
(operators such as large network carriers, low cost carriers, regional and freight 
carriers) employ dry charters similar to that of scenario 4 (bareboat charter) as 
opposed to relatively small percentage employing wet leases analogous to time 
charter (e.g. business carriers). As seen we have seen it is common practice to 
place blanket assumptions on the shipping sector with regards to the principle agent 
problems in context of energy efficiency without due consideration of the 
heterogeneity in the shipping markets. The ability to pass fuel costs, flexibility on who 
pays for fuel, impact of business cycles, different charter parties and different sectors 
(ship types and trades) existing within shipping call for a thorough investigation of the 
principal agent problem in respect of the heterogeneity of the sectors. Some of the 
important questions that need to be investigated are: 
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 Does the principle agent problem really exist, is it limiting the potential for energy 
efficiency?  
 To what extent does adoption of energy efficiency vary between markets 
(wet/dry/container)? 
 How are charterparties set in different markets, what are the variables and which 
have priorities? 
 And ultimately, which stakeholder has the highest level of incentive so as to be 
targeted as the responsible entity in a mbm? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Type of charters in shipping and principal agent problem 
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5. Application of the Viable Systems Model for analysis of barriers to energy 
efficiency in shipping 
 
Beer‘s (1979) Viable Systems Model (VSM) is a systems thinking tool originating 
from organisational cybernetics (OC, relating to control and communication in 
organisations). VSM is proposed to be the best known model for modelling 
organisations, with the capability of designing and diagnosing organisations 
(Schwaninger and Rios, 2008). It has been applied in many cases for micro level 
understanding of systems (Nystorm 2006a, 2006b, Devine, 2005, Vidgen 1998) but 
not limited to such applications (Shaw et al, 2004). In order to find fundamental 
solutions a system must be viewed as a whole where key leverage lies in the 
interactions of the parts and not simply one piece (Senge, 1992). Thus, VSM is 
concerned with a system‘s essential organization i.e. with what defines the system 
and enables the maintenance of its identity/viability (Jackson, 1989). Having 
identified the various stakeholders, networks, markets and many other variables in 
shipping as well as barriers pertaining to energy efficiency and policies, it is 
important to view each as a sub set of systems (recursive levels), overarched by a 
general shipping system.  
Beer (1979) defines the five subsystems of a viable system and how they interact to 
control an organisation. The key roles of the five subsystems are summarised below: 
System Name Role 
Neuro-
physiological 
Subsystem 1 Operations 
Primary activities, core 
functions, self sustaining 
processes 
Muscles, organs 
Subsystem 2 Co-ordination 
Resource bargaining and 
distribution, Conflict resolution 
Nervous system 
Subsystem 3 Control 
Internal eye – Strength and 
Weaknesses through internal 
regulation. Efficiency 
Base brain 
Subsystem 4 Intelligence 
External eye – Opportunites 
and Threats through 
environmental scanning. 
Input from sense 
Subsystem 5 Policy 
Ultimate authority, Strategy 
Formulation, Provides 
certification, ground rules, 
Cortex 
 
 
Table 1: Summary of component roles in a viable system     Rehmatulla (2008) 
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The five systems are further categorized into three main elements. They consist of 
operations, metasystem and the environment. The operations is where the primary 
activity of the organisation takes place, the metasystem element ensures everything 
within the system is working and operating well together and the environment refers 
to the external environment over which a system has little influence. A fundamental 
proposition inherent in the theory of VSM is that social systems are structured 
recursively, which allows us to analyse the structure of systems at many levels, 
above and below the system in focus. For the scope of this paper the different levels 
of recursions that can be applied are; at the industry level (shipping industry as a 
whole), sectoral level (main markets tanker, dry bulker, container, other), sub 
sectoral (crude oil carriers and products carriers, major and minor dry bulkers etc), 
business unit level (individual firms in the sub sectoral level) and even lower 
according to Simon (1969). Since much of the paper has argued for heterogeneous 
outlook towards the industry, in theory each will have its own VSM but subsystems 
1-5 can be referred to being in the same hierarchy for all the levels, so subsystem 5 
of the charterer can be compared to subsystem 5 of the shipowner, as well as of the 
regulator (Shaw et al, 2004). Therefore It is appropriate to look at different business 
units (broad stakeholder groups) existing within the industry. The system in focus for 
the purposes of this paper (principal agent problem) is to look at the charterer, 
shipowner, as separate business units, with particular analysis on energy efficiency 
and environmental regulation. In order for a system to continue to be viable in the 
face of environmental requirements, it has to have the capability of adaption (Vidgen, 
1998). In this case, the environmental requirements for the shipowners‘ are meeting 
the forthcoming mandatory requirements for EEDI, and other annexes to Maritime 
Pollution (MARPOL) related to SO2 and NOX. The functions of the subsystems of 
the key stakeholders (business level) in the tanker sector are outlined below (in 
relation to energy efficiency in different charters): 
 
 Subsystem 1 (operations) -  supply of ships (shipowner in voyage, time & 
bareboat charter) and demand for ships (charterer in voyage, time & bareboat 
charter), day to day running of ships (crewing, bunkering, complying with 
MARPOL, etc in control of shipowner) 
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 Subsystem 2 (co-ordination) – supervision of day to day running of ships, fuel 
consumed/loaded (shipowner in voyage charter), centralised planning for other 
activities (e.g. crewing) is higher priority (shipowner in voyage & time charter) 
supervising day to day activity of ship chartered through daily reports sent by 
master of the ship (charterer in voyage charter) 
 Subsystem 3 (monitoring and control)– continuous stock take of energy efficiency 
improvements that can be made to ship (owner operated fleet), monitoring for 
speed and daily consumption to abide by charterparty clauses (ship owner in 
voyage and time charter) using fuel efficiently, negotiating contracts based on 
energy efficiency of ships and vetting of ships (charterer in voyage and time 
charter), retrofitting (charterer in bareboat charter), optimising the charterparty 
(charterer in time and bareboat charter) 
 Subsystem 4 (intelligence) – dealing with environmental regulations such as the 
EEDI & MARPOL that affect the supply of ships (Shipowner in voyage, time & 
bareboat charter), searching for energy efficient ships (Charterer in voyage 
charter) searching for ships that will comply to future regulations (Charterer in 
time and bareboat charter) 
 Subsystem 5 (policy) – establish the approach to shipping, cheap and dirty or 
clean and pricey (shipowner in voyage charter ) establish the approach to 
shipping by focussing on owning and operating own fleet of ships (charterer in 
bareboat charter) 
 
Having briefly identified the key roles of the ship owner and charterer in the current 
state, we can now use the VSM to show how some of these stakeholders‘ roles, 
processes, interactions and information flows may change if a hypothetical mbm is 
added. It is assumed that allowances are grandfathered/auctioned only to 
responsible entity i.e. the shipowner and they are transferred to charterer under long 
term time/bareboat charter. The functions of the subsystems of the key stakeholders 
(business level) in the tanker sector are outlined below (in relation to a hypothetical 
ETS in different charters) is outlined below: 
 
 Subsystem 1 – supply of ships (shipowner in voyage, time & bareboat charter) 
and demand for ships (charterer in voyage, time & bareboat charter), day to day 
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running of ships (crewing, bunkering, complying with MARPOL, surrendering 
CO2 allowances, all in control of shipowner) surrendering CO2 allowances 
(charterer in time/bareboat charter) 
 Subsystem 2 - supervision of day to day running of ships, daily fuel 
consumption/bunkering operations (hedging), trading of allowances, allocation of 
allowances to ships, invoicing charterer for additional CO2 cost (shipowner in 
voyage charter), supervising day to day activity of ship chartered through daily 
reports sent by master of the ship (charterer in voyage charter), optimising the 
charterparty (charterer in time and bareboat charter)  
 Subsystem 3 - continuous stock take of energy efficiency improvements that can 
be made to ship e.g. cost savings shown by DNV (2009), (owner operated fleet 
and shipowner in voyage charter), monitoring for speed and daily consumption to 
abide by charterparty clauses (ship owner in voyage and time charter) using fuel 
efficiently, negotiating contracts based on energy efficiency of ships and vetting 
of ships (charterer in voyage and time charter), retrofitting (charterer in bareboat 
charter) 
 Subsystem 4 – sell/scrap ships that are consistently exceeding allowances when 
costs are borne by owner, buy ships on the basis of profiting from surplus 
allowances (shipowner in voyage charter), renegotiation of ship charters on the 
basis of allowances supplied by shipowner (charterer in time and voyage 
charter), constant outlook towards energy efficient ships and tightening targets for 
emission reduction (shipowner and charterer) 
 Subsystem 5 – decisions whether to or not to prioritise energy efficiency of ships 
(shipowner in all markets), establish the approach to shipping by focussing on 
owning and operating own fleet in order to be in control of CO2 emissions and 
allowances (charterer in bareboat charter) 
 
5.1. Discussion  
Any mbm, be it a levy or ETS will have to target/incentivise a responsible entity, the 
same way as the EEDI targets shipowners and ship yards (back end of the supply 
chain). CE Delft et al (2009), in their analysis of several policy measures identify 
seven probable stakeholders (the registered owner, ship operator, ship manager, 
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charterer, consignee, fuel supplier and the ship itself). The nature of the industry is 
such that each of these may change even during a single accounting year, making it 
difficult to enforce and monitor an mbm. Norway‘s proposal for global ETS (IMO 
2010b) makes the ship the responsible entity, therefore any party interested in its 
operation will have the incentive to pay for its emissions.  Nonetheless if we assume 
the shipowner to be the responsible entity (CE Delft approach), how much change 
will we see? As previous discussion has illustrated, there might be no change at all 
due to the principal agent problem existing in a large part of the tanker sector. Cost 
pass through rates in the industry is of paramount importance, they have been 
brought up many times at the IMO discussions and recently in the intersessional 
meeting for GHG meeting, China followed by its non-annex i counterparts claimed 
that in shipping its the final consumer that pays the costs. Costs can be related to 
inefficient operations as well as additional CO2 prices (IMO, 2011). 
 
In the operations (subsystem 1) we see that under the voyage charter the shipowner 
will subsume most of the responsibility in relation to the running of the ship and when 
an ETS is in place, also be the responsible entity for the emissions, hence 
surrendering allowances. Since the shipowner is liable for bunker costs, which 
account for around 30 - 50% (Lloyds list, 2010; Stopford 2009), then one would 
assume that there is a high incentive for reducing this cost item through fuel saving 
technology or operations. Two key points emerge that may explain the inaction; the 
cost profile and the number of cost items the shipowner is responsible under this 
charter is quite high and therefore the priority to energy efficiency may be dampened 
e.g. focus on capital repayments, which account for roughly 40 - 50% for ships 5-10 
year old ships, in contrast to fuel costs which account for 25% for the same age 
category (specific sample of capsize bulkers, Stopford, 2009). Secondly, the inaction 
may be due to the level of cost pass through seen in the markets. Vivid economics 
(2010) through econometric modelling estimates that cost pass through in South 
Korean oil markets is around 111% and about 73% for US crude oil markets, which 
suggests that there is a likelihood that the principal agent problem exists in this 
market. This poses a paradoxical challenge for policy makers as to what should be 
the optimal level of carbon price so as to induce change within industry without the 
burden being borne by final consumers. Furthermore throughout much of this paper, 
the principal agent problem showed that the charterer (the principal) is the 
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responsible entity in paying for fuel bills under the time and bareboat charterer. 
Although this may be contractually the case, the charterer will also not bear the costs 
of fuel and pass along the cost to the shipper, and as such the principal agent 
problem is transferred, as illustrated below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Levels of principal agent problem 
 
If energy costs are paid by the shipper (indirectly through freight costs), then the 
agent who is now the charterer has little incentive to improve the energy efficiency of 
the ship on charter. According to Lloyds List (2010) after inventory costs that account 
for 52%, the next biggest cost item for shippers is fuel costs accounting for 26% of 
the total costs, followed by 10% capital costs. This may suggest that shippers have 
the incentive chose fuel efficient ships over inefficient ones. However this priority 
may be blurred because the shipper seldom sees the fuel cost/energy efficiency of 
the ships on which its cargo travels, as well as being focussed on reliability of 
service, transit times, inventory costs. To some extent the industry in general has 
moved towards transparency and Carbon War Rooms Shippingefficiency.org and 
Clean Cargo Working Group are prime examples of this. Much of this information 
from the environment is the function of Subsystem four of the VSM, and in the 
context of shipowners deals with environmental regulation and decides on how much 
priority is actually accorded to energy efficiency. This may mainly come from 
membership of ship owner associations such as International Parcel Tanker 
Association (IPTA), Intertanko, Intercargo, etc, which actively participate in the 
regulatory body (IMO) committees. Thus the level of interaction with external 
environment at higher levels largely depends on these organisations and their 
interaction with shipowners metasystem to promote energy efficiency.   
Agent 
Shipowner  
Ship Principal  
Charterer Rent 
Fuel 
Payments 
Level 1: Ship owner and charterer (medium time 
charter) 
Principle agent 
problem does exist 
Agent 
Charterer  
Cargo 
space Principal 
Shipper Freight 
rate 
Level 2: Charterer and shipper  
Principle agent 
problem does exist 
Cost of 
fuel in 
freight 
rate 
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Voyage Charter 
Stakeholder Subsystem 1 Subsystem 2 Subsystem 3 Subsystem 4 Subsystem 5 
Ship owner supply of ships, 
day to day running of 
ships inc. Fuel 
Supervision of day to day 
running of ships, fuel 
consumed/loaded, Centralised 
planning for other activities 
(e.g. crewing, routing) 
Charter party arrangements 
Monitoring for speed and 
daily consumption to 
abide by charterparty 
clauses 
Dealing with 
environmental 
regulations, 
 
Establish the 
approach to 
shipping 
Charterer Demand for ships, 
Pays for daily rates 
Charterparty 
arrangements 
Supervising day to day activity 
of ship chartered e.g fuel 
consumed.  
Using fuel efficiently, 
negotiating contracts 
based on energy 
efficiency of ships and 
vetting of ships 
Searching for 
energy efficient 
ships  
Establish the 
approach to 
shipping 
 
Voyage Charter in a hypothetical ETS 
Stakeholder Subsystem 1 Subsystem 2 Subsystem 3 Subsystem 4 Subsystem 5 
Ship owner supply of ships, 
day to day running of 
ships inc. Fuel and 
surrendering 
allowances 
Supervision of day to day 
running of ships, fuel 
consumed/loaded, Centralised 
planning for other activities 
(e.g. crewing, routing) as well 
as 
trading of allowances, 
allocation of allowances to 
ships, invoicing charterer for 
additional CO2 cost 
Charter party arrangements 
Monitoring for speed and 
daily consumption to 
abide by charterparty 
clauses 
Dealing with 
environmental 
regulations, 
Fleet management 
(Sale & Purchase) 
according to 
energy efficiency 
 
Establish the 
approach to 
shipping 
Charterer Demand for ships, 
Pays for daily rates 
Charterparty 
arrangements may or 
may not include 
responsibility for CO2 
allowances 
Supervising day to day activity 
of ship chartered e.g fuel 
consumed.  
Optimising charterparty if 
responsible for CO2 costs 
Using fuel efficiently, 
negotiating contracts 
based on energy 
efficiency of ships and 
vetting of ships 
Searching for 
energy efficient 
ships, 
renegotiation of 
ship charters on 
the basis of 
energy efficiency 
Establish the 
approach to 
shipping 
Table 2: System roles of shipowner and charterer under voyage charter contract
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Conclusions 
Perhaps the largest opportunity for significant energy efficiency and C02 reduction 
lies between shipowner and charterer. The divided responsibility for fuel costs 
existing between the two stakeholders arising from different types of chartering 
arrangements prevalent in the industry is an institutional barrier that needs to be 
overcome. In many cases standard charterparties are outdated and not focussed on 
energy efficiency (CWR, 2011). An example of such modification was provided, 
‗Virtual Arrival‘ which showed firstly the existence of non energy efficient practices at 
least within the tanker industry and secondly showed potential significant savings in 
trials. This paper has made an attempt to understand these barriers by applying 
systems thinking approaches, to structure the problem and provide a holistic view of 
the situation. Stakeholder mapping allowed the whole supply chain and actors 
involved within it to be captured. Upon identifying the key stakeholders, economic 
theory of the principal agent problem was discussed, which showed that the problem 
may be affecting a significant proportion of end-use energy. Further quantification 
and analysis of the principal agent problem in shipping may provide policymakers at 
the IMO with valuable insights into the significance of the problem, where necessary, 
guidance on implementing additional policy measures to overcome these market 
barriers to energy efficiency and assessing the effectiveness of policy measures in 
light of the barrier. We saw that shipowner will invest in energy efficiency measures 
when regulated and unable to pass on the costs, whereas a charterer theoratically 
will invest in energy efficiency when has the ability to do so (dependent on the type 
of charter), thus an mbm might be less of an incentive for a charterer than a 
shipowner, at least in some markets. The time horizon element is crucial for 
investments and probably one of the reasons why uptake of many cost saving 
measures are not being undertaken. This calls for further decomposition of marginal 
abatement cost curves to reflect these market variations, may be through a series of 
macc‘s for e.g. for tanker sector in voyage charter, dry bulk sector in bareboat 
charter etc.  
 
VSM analysis briefly described the system processes at different levels existing 
between the shipowner and charterer. Using the information from preceding 
sections, each stakeholders subsystem roles are viewed in order to see where the 
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principal agent problem is rooted. It is found that lower level sub systems of 
shipowner operating in voyage charter/spot markets are primarily focussed on basic 
delivery of service without much priority accorded to energy efficiency. When an 
mbm is introduced depending on the nature of the market the costs might be borne 
or passed through. Charterers in all charter markets on the other hand have their 
lower level sub systems in theory focussed on energy efficiency, (provided costs are 
borne by the charterer and not simply passed on). Further research is required here 
to assess the level of cost pass through between charterers and shippers and to final 
consumers. Moreover to answer some of the questions posed earlier, verify the 
assumptions and to gain a fuller understanding of the shipping markets for the 
investigation of principal agent problem, a methodology combining systems thinking 
methods and generic social research methods is required. This combination has very 
rarely been applied with only a handful of papers and postulates a methodological 
paper currently being worked on.  
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Appendix 
Cost Allocation in different types of charter existing in shipping 
Cost element 
Voyage 
charter Time charter 
Bareboat 
charter 
 
$/tonne $/day $/day 
Cargo Handling       
Load port       
Discharge port       
        
Voyage Expenses       
Fuel       
Port dues       
Canal dues       
        
Operating 
expense       
Crewing       
Stores & lubes       
Repairs       
Surveys       
P&I/insurance       
management       
        
Capital costs       
Interest       
Dividends       
Debt repayment       
    Charterer  
  Ship owner   
   
Marginal Abatement Cost Curve for shipping in 2030 
 
 
 
 
